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Climatepolicies requirepublic support.But if people feel excluded fromdecisionmaking, this can fuel resistance
to such policies. Legal frameworks, such as the Aarhus Convention, mandate extensive obligations to engage
the public in decision making on local projects, such as renewable energy siting. But such frameworks often
overlook the macro-level decisions that affect local projects. Public influence at a project level may be limited
by such macro-level decisions. A solution could be to engage the public earlier in the decision-making chain.
But is thiswhat peoplewant? In thisPerspective,wepresent a survey in theNetherlands (n=1,121) that revealed
that people want to participatemost in decisionmaking on local projects—exactly where their influence ismost
limited due to legal constraints.We propose a cross-disciplinary research agenda for studying how to reconcile
legal frameworks and public preferences for participation to reach socially acceptable climate policies.Introduction
Ambitious policies are needed to accelerate sustainable energy
transition and mitigate climate change.1 Polls show that many
people believe in anthropogenic climate change and support
a sustainable energy transition.2 However, when climate goals
turn into policy solutions, they often face public resistance.
Prominent examples are the ‘‘Yellow vests’’ movement trig-
gered by rising fuel taxes in France and anti-wind protests in
Europe and beyond. Resistance may occur if people feel that
they are excluded from decision making and perceive the deci-
sion-making procedures as unfair.3–5 Indeed, when asked, peo-
ple indicate strongly that they want to participate in decision
making on climate policy and mitigation options.3,6,7 Yet, little
is known about how and when people want to participate in
climate policy making. Such knowledge is critical to inform
legal frameworks that regulate public participation procedures,
such as the Aarhus Convention of the United Nations.8 If legal
frameworks for participation procedures are not in line with
public preferences, people may not participate and/or may still
perceive the decision-making process as unfair. This may un-
dermine public support necessary to implement climate change
mitigation policies.
Public participation in decision making has been flagged as a
key factor for socially acceptable climate policies.9–11 Public
participation refers here to processes organized by responsible
parties (e.g., elected officials, government agencies, other pub-
lic- or private-sector organizations) to deliberately engage the
public in the planning, development, and implementation of
climate policies.12 The commonly proposed benefits of public
participation include its (1) normative function, namely democra-
tizing the decision-making process, (2) substantive function,
namely enabling the public to understand scientific facts and
to advance decision making by bringing in their own knowledge,
values, and concerns, and (3) instrumental function, namelyOne Earth 2, A
This is an open access article undincreasing the legitimacy and social acceptability of the deci-
sion-making procedures and their outcomes.9,13–18
In climate policy in particular, public participation is rapidly be-
ing incorporated into political agendas. For example, in response
to the Yellow vests movement in France, President Macron
invited all citizens to express their concerns about their country’s
political issues in the ‘‘GrandDe´bat National.’’ In theNetherlands,
local governments are currently developing ‘‘Regional energy
strategies’’ where they invite the public to discuss issues, such
as the development of wind parks. Yet, in thewake of such accel-
erated efforts to increase public participation, still little is known
about how andwhen to best engage the public to reachmore so-
cially acceptable climate policies.9,11 To address this knowledge
gap, we study public preferences for participation in climate pol-
icy making. We concur that if public participation is done well it
can have great benefits.12,14,17 For that, we argue it is important
that legal frameworks for public participation are in harmony
withwhenandhowpeoplewish toparticipate.We report the find-
ings fromacombined lawandpsychology study to highlight a po-
tential cleavage between legal frameworks and public prefer-
ences for participation. Based on the findings, we propose a
forward-looking, cross-disciplinary research agenda for studying
how to reconcile legal frameworks and public preferences to
reach socially acceptable climate policies.
Early and Meaningful Participation
In social sciences, effective public participation rests on the key
concepts of early engagement, namely involving people in deci-
sion making when all options are still open, and real voice,
namely allowing people to shape the final decision.3,19–22 This
derives from normative theories on public participation empha-
sizing the importance of two-way communication between
responsible actors and the public, in an iterative process of revis-
iting and revising policies through constructive deliberation.23–26pril 24, 2020 ª 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. 341
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Figure 1. Decision-Making Chain
Schematic overview of the chain of decision making
on climate policies, with examples from the Dutch
climate policy making.
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OPEN ACCESS PerspectiveThe seminal participation ladder differentiates between non-
participation and tokenism, on the one hand, and partnership,
delegated power, and citizen control, on the other hand.19 Only
the higher levels of the participation ladder are considered to
be genuine and meaningful forms of participation that can
improve decision making and produce more socially acceptable
outcomes.19 Indeed, the more people perceive that they can
voice their opinions early in decision making, the higher the pub-
lic acceptability of the respective climate policies.3,27–30 More-
over, public acceptability of energy projects is higher when peo-
ple can influence major decisions, such as what kind of energy
projects would come where, rather than minor decisions, such
as the details of the infrastructure (e.g., the type and color of so-
lar panels to be installed).31 In contrast, engaging people when
the policy is already fait accompli or informing and consulting
them but not incorporating their input in the final decisions,
known as pseudo or fake participation, can fuel public
resistance.3,7,17,30,32 The latter may be a result of public partici-
pation being just a ‘‘box-ticking practice,’’ when minimal public
procedures are organized that do not provide real room for pub-
lic input and/or may even marginalize certain groups in soci-
ety.33–35
Public participation is therefore a grand societal and environ-
mental challenge. If organized properly, it can enhance democ-
racy and meet the urgent demand for action to combat climate
change. In contrast, if organized poorly, it can fuel resistance342 One Earth 2, April 24, 2020and polarization, and halt climate action.
Therefore, it is urgent to better understand
and inform policy makers about how to
organize public participation so that it is
effective, rather than counterproductive,
in developing more socially acceptable
climate policies.
Unveiling the Chain of Public
Participation
The United Nations-based Aarhus
Convention is the prime legal framework
that mandates access to information and
possibility for citizens to participate in de-
cision making on environmental matters.8
This document is binding for 47 European
countries and inspired similar approaches
in South America, with the Escazu agree-
ment,36 and in China.37 The Aarhus
Convention can thus be used as a refer-
ence document for discussing the legal
framework for public participation in envi-
ronmental matters, including climate
action.
The Aarhus Convention echoes the
importance of early and meaningful public
participation by mandating ‘‘reasonabletime-frames’’ to inform the public and to allow for a response,
at a time when ‘‘all options are possible’’ and participation can
be ‘‘effective,’’ and that responsible authorities should ‘‘take
the views’’ expressed by the public ‘‘in due account.’’8,38–42
The Aarhus Convention sets these obligations most stringently
for decision making on a project level where specific policy solu-
tions are being implemented, such as giving the authorization to
build a wind park.43 Importantly, however, such decisions are
preceded by macro-policy levels, namely policy visions, plans,
and programs that establish, for example, suitable locations for
renewable energy siting. Policy visions, plans, programs, and
eventually projects together form the decision-making chain43
(Figure 1).
International agreements, such as the Paris Climate Agree-
ment, and supranational laws, such as EU law (e.g., reducing
CO2 emissions in member states),
44,45 form the first tier of the
decision-making chain. The next tier contains national pol-
icies—either stemming from international policies or starting on
their own—and national plans, programs, and decisions. In
states with decentralized governance structures on climate pol-
icy, such as the Netherlands, the chain continues with policies,
plans, programs, and decisions in a regional and local tier (see
Figure 1). So, the decision-making chain may traverse from inter-
national to national to regional and local tier, and within the tiers,
from visions to plans and programs and to specific decisions.
The decision-making chain may also encompass smaller-scale
ll
OPEN ACCESSPerspectiveand bottom-up actions, such as local renewable energy initia-
tives or city initiatives to combat climate change (e.g., c40.org).
Notably, such initiatives still need to abide to macro-level regula-
tions (e.g., national, regional, local land-use planning policies)
and they may create a decision-making chain of their own
(e.g., city policies, plans, programs, and local projects).46
The Aarhus Convention mandates public participation at all
tiers of the decision-making chain, except for international
agreements and regulations. Yet, while the Aarhus Convention
(cf. Articles 6 and 7) mandates extensive obligations for early
and meaningful public participation at the level of projects, it
has less such obligations at the level of plans and programs,
and no such obligations at higher policy level.43 At the same
time, it is obvious from the above that the presence of multiple
levels in the decision-making chain has important implications
for the effectiveness of public participation.
At a project level, many important decisions have already been
made at the macro-policy levels within the chain. This puts con-
straints on the type of influence that the public can still have. For
example, authorization to build a wind park is a specific decision
on a national, regional, or local level, which may have followed
from national, regional, or local energy plans and programs,
which in turn have been guided by (inter)national climate agree-
ments. In effect, this implies that even if public participation
takes place early in decision making about the authorization of
a wind park, important decisions that have major influence on
subsequent projects, such as where the wind turbines should
be located and how much energy they should produce, have
already been made at a macro-policy level (hereafter macro-
level decisions).33,43 At a project level, the options left open for
discussion have a less extensive impact, for example, where to
locate trees to reduce the visual and sound impact of the wind
turbines (hereafter micro-level decisions).
Based on the Aarhus Convention, options discussed while
adopting policies, plans, and programs do not need to be dis-
cussed again when deciding about eventual projects, and com-
ments concerning such options can be considered time
barred.38,43 Even more, the legal principle of res judicata means
that once a legal matter has been settled, such as the content of
a plan or program, that matter cannot be discussed again after a
reasonable time has elapsed or after a party challenged a plan or
program in court but lost the dispute.47 Res judicata can stand in
the way of reconsidering macro-level decisions at micro-level
decisions making. The room for by-passing the principle of res
judicata varies in accordance with legal traditions,48 but is gener-
ally limited.47
All in all, the way that public participation is organized and
regulated today may result in people being able to influence
only minor rather than major decisions. This may limit or even
reduce the quality and public acceptability of climate policies.
The question is how to ensure early andmeaningful public partic-
ipation that is not constrained by macro-level decisions made
earlier. A possible legal fix could be to mandate more public
engagement at macro-level decision making. However, we
argue that it is critical to consider when and how people want
to participate at different levels of the decision-making chain
before engaging in legal reforms that might be counterproduc-
tive. Notably, if legal frameworks mandate public participation,
but the public is not able and/or motivated to participate, publicparticipation will not be more than a ‘‘box-ticking practice,’’
failing to produce its desired benefits.
Unveiling Public Preferences for Public Participation
So far, studies on public preferences for participation have been
primarily concerned with community engagement in decisions
on local projects, such as renewable energy siting.9 Although it
can be concluded based on these studies that people want to
be involved early and have influence over decisions, little is
known about public preferences for participation in macro-level
decision making. Essentially, no study has looked at public pref-
erences for participation throughout the entire decision-making
chain on climate policies. Here, we present a case study from
the Netherlands as a first step to address this knowledge gap
and to spur and inform future research on this important topic.
In the Netherlands, the goals of the Paris Agreement are
currently being translated into regional sustainable energy strate-
gies. Specifically, the Dutch government has put the goals of the
Paris Agreement in the national Climate Agreement49 and
Climate Plan50 and has entrusted the country’s different regions
to develop their own, local strategies to meet these goals
(regionale-energiestrategie.nl). As a case in point, we focus on
one such region, namely the Province of Groningen in the north
of theNetherlands. TheProvince ofGroningen is an important en-
ergy region in the Netherlands, because here the country’s prime
energy source, namely natural gas, is being extracted. To realize
the sustainable energy transition, gas extraction needs to be
phased out and the region needs to develop alternative ways to
generate energy. In this study, we examine how local people
wish toparticipate indecisionmakingonsustainable energy tran-
sition. Specifically, we conducted a questionnaire study with cit-
izens in this region, including different age, gender, income, and
education groups (for details, see Experimental Procedures).
We asked respondents to what extent local residents should
be informed, have a say, and decide about the sustainable en-
ergy transition in their province, respectively. Respondents
particularly wanted to be informed and have a say, and ex-
pressed a lower preference for the public being able to decide
about the energy transition; thesemeans were statistically signif-
icantly different from each other (F(1.600, 1705.702) = 908.918;
p < 0.001; h2 = 0.460; p < 0.001 for all multiple comparisons;
Figure 2).
Next, we asked to what extent local residents should be
involved in decision making about developing general visions,
regional strategies, and concrete projects for sustainable energy
transition. Although respondents wanted the public to be involved
in all these decisions, they expressed a higher preference for the
public to be involved particularly in decision making on projects,
and less in decision making on regional strategies and general vi-
sions, respectively; these means were statistically significantly
different from each other (F(1.693, 1809.877) = 165.181; p <
0.001;h2 = 0.134; p < 0.001 for allmultiple comparisons; Figure 3).
Similarly, respondents wanted the public to be particularly
involved in decision making about the energy transition in their
direct environment and less indecisionmakingon the energy tran-
sition in their municipality, province, and the Netherlands, respec-
tively; these means were statistically significantly different from
each other (F(1.818, 1959.505) = 623.541; p < 0.001; h2 = 0.366;
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Figure 2. Preferred Type of Participation
Preferences for the public to be informed, have a say, and decide about
sustainable energy transition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals;
n = 1,067. Preferences were measured with two items, namely how desirable
(1, not at all; 7, very) and necessary (1, not at all; 7, very) it is to inform residents,
give them a say, and let them decide about sustainable energy transition; the











Concrete projects Regional strategies for energy
transiƟon
General visions about energy
transiƟon
Figure 3. Preferred Level of Participation
Preferences for public participation in different types of decisions. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals; n = 1,070. Preferences were measured
with two items, namely how desirable (1, not at all; 7, very) and necessary (1,
not at all; 7, very) it is to involve residents in these different types of decisions;
the scores on these two items were averaged.
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OPEN ACCESS PerspectiveOverall, we find that people want to be informed and have a
say about climate policies, yet are less willing to make the deci-
sions themselves. This is in line with theorizing5 and initial qual-
itative evidence51 that people want to have a say in decision
making, but they expect responsible parties to make the deci-
sions. The highest rung of the participation ladder, namely citizen
control,19 may therefore not be the priority for the public. Yet, we
found that people want to retain some control, because overall,
the willingness to decide was not very low and for many partici-
pants it was high. There are some good examples of sharing the
decision-making power between the governments and the
affected publics in co-managing natural resources.52 Yet,
research is needed to better understand the conditions under
which the public is willing and able to carry the responsibility
for such shared decision making.
Most importantly, we find that people are more willing to
participate in micro- than macro-level decision making. This in-
troduces a paradox, when considering the previous findings
that people accept climate policy more if they can influence ma-
jor decisions, such as what kind of projects should come where,
rather than only minor decisions, such as the details of the infra-
structure.31 Currently, suchmajor decisions aremade at amacro
level and are no longer discussed at a micro level. Hence, by
wanting to participate more in micro- than macro-level decision
making, as found in this study, people may be limiting the sort of
influence they have on energy projects. Taken together, the way
that decision making is currently organized and how people pre-
fer to participate in decision making may, in fact, inhibit early and
meaningful public participation in climate policy making. Our
case study illustrates this paradox and calls for future research
into public preferences for participation and ways to incorporate
these preferences in legal frameworks and governance struc-
tures on climate policy.
Research Agenda
Our key finding is that people want to influence decision making
particularly on local projects, rather than climate policy making
on a national and global level. This raises two important con-344 One Earth 2, April 24, 2020cerns. First, if people participate only in micro-level decision
making, they may not have a say in major decisions. This may
result in perceived low procedural fairness and public resistance
against the respective projects. Second, this limits the extent to
which global and national climate policy making can draw on the
knowledge and insights of citizens, which could enrich policy
making by substantiating and deliberating the discussed op-
tions.17,53 Hence, an important question is how to reconcile pub-
lic preferences and legal frameworks for public participation. We
identify two possible directions. The first direction is to engage
the public more in macro-level decision making, where people
can still influence major decisions. The second direction is to
provide more room for public influence in micro-level decision
making, where people want to participate most.
In view of these two directions, we draw avenues for future
cross-disciplinary research into legal frameworks, on the one
hand, and public preferences, on the other hand, to examine
when and how they could be reconciled. Next, we argue that
research is needed to assess whether and when each of the
two proposed directions for public participation is effective in
increasing perceived procedural fairness and public accept-
ability of climate policy making. Our proposed research agenda
focuses on reconciling legal frameworks and public preferences
for public participation and does not include the preferences of
decision makers. Public participation depends on the ability
and motivation of decision makers to engage the public early
and meaningfully and to prevent pseudo or fake participation.
Although beyond the scope of the current research agenda,
future research is needed to study key enablers and barriers
for decision makers to effectively engage the public in climate
policy making. Below, we outline the two directions for recon-
ciling legal frameworks and public preferences, together with
the respective avenues for cross-disciplinary research in the
view of each direction.
Increasing Public Participation at a Macro Level
We have found that both legal frameworks and public prefer-
ences may anchor public participation downstream of the deci-
sion-making chain. Future research could study under which
conditions public participation can be dispersed upward in the



















Energy transiƟon in the
Netherlands
Figure 4. Preferred Scope of Participation
Preferences for public participation at different levels of decision making. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals; n = 1,079. Preferences were
measured with one item, namely how much (1, not at all; 7, very much) people
want to be involved in decision making about energy transition in the
Netherlands, their province, their municipality, and their direct environment.
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OPEN ACCESSPerspectivethe perceived procedural fairness and public acceptability of
climate policy making.
Research on Legal Frameworks. Although the Aarhus Conven-
tion does not establish specific obligations about public participa-
tion when establishing policies, it does not prevent State parties
from establishing such obligations.43 Different countries may
have their own approaches to public participation that go beyond
what is mandated by the Aarhus Convention.54 In the
Netherlands, for example, public authorities must justify how
they have taken public voice into consideration when establishing
policies.55 In addition, rules fostering public participation atmacro
level could be derived from outside the environmental law field.
For example, Switzerland uses direct democracy, mostly refer-
enda, as a form of public participation across the entire deci-
sion-making chain, including at the policy level.56 This practice
applies to environmental law,57 but it derives from constitutional
law.58 Future research could compare rules in different countries
(i.e., external comparison54) and different legal disciplines (e.g.,
environmental, administrative, and constitutional law; internal
comparison) to studywhich aspects of (inter)national rules and in-
stitutions enable or limit public participation at macro levels,
whether such regulations increase or decrease public participa-
tion at such levels, and how they may need to be revised.
Research on Public Preferences. Future studies could identify
key factors that influence people’s preferences to participate
at different levels of decision making and particularly at macro
levels. Participation procedures may require time, effort, and
skills (e.g., public speaking), which may prevent people—espe-
cially marginalized groups (e.g., lower education, income)—
from participating.14,34,35,59 Particularly at the macro level, the
policies, visions, and programs that are discussed may be highly
abstract, complex, and qualified by many uncertainties, creating
barriers for (some) people to effectively engage in the discus-
sion.11 Importantly, there is initial evidence that people can
engage with topics, such as climate policy and energy transition,
even on a national scale, if provided with balanced information
and opportunities to deliberate the different options.60,61 In addi-
tion to what enables people to participate, it is important to study
what motivates them to participate, at a macro level. Given thelimited time and effort they may want to invest, people may pri-
oritize participation at a micro level, which may seem to them
closer and more important, than at a macro level, which may
feel remote and less important. Relatedly, people may not
want to participate if it is not clear to them howmacro-policy de-
cisions will affect local projects. Future studies could test
whether explicating the links between macro-level decision
making and local projects increases people’s willingness to
participate in macro-level decision making.
Assessing the Effectiveness of Public Participation. It is impor-
tant to understand what effects public participation—or the
absence thereof—at macro-policy levels has on other levels of
the decision-making chain. Initial evidence suggests that when
civil society organizations are included in (versus excluded
from) global climate governance, people perceive the decision-
making process as more transparent and representative (i.e.,
two important facets of perceived procedural fairness).62,63
The question is, however, how the perceived fairness of
macro-level decision making influences perceived fairness and
public acceptability of the relevant projects later. To our best
knowledge, there has been no attempt so far to study such ripple
effects of public participation across the decision-making chain.
Longitudinal studies could examine the relationships between
public participation, perceived procedural fairness, and public
acceptability of decisions across the entire chain from policies
to projects, possibly encompassing the national, regional, and
local tiers. A highly novel contribution to the literature would be
experimental studies that enable us to compare public accept-
ability of decisions that underwent public participation at
different tiers and levels of the decision-making chain.
Increasing Public Influence at a Micro Level
The current study provides initial evidence that people especially
want to participate in micro-level decision making. This gives
impetus to a novel approach to examine whether and how the
whole decision-making chain could be reconfigured to provide
more room for public influence at this level.
Research on Legal Frameworks. At micro-level decision mak-
ing, the Aarhus Convention only sets a general duty to ensure
that participation takes place when all options are still open. It
does not specify which options must be open and it actually al-
lows State parties not to discuss options that were already dis-
cussed at macro-level decision making. However, it does not
restrict State parties from allowing such possibility, therefore
setting a higher standard for public participation than required
under the Aarhus Convention. Again thus, countries may have
more stringent obligations that go beyond the Aarhus Conven-
tion. Future comparative research could examine whether and
what regulations exist across countries (i.e., external compari-
son) that could facilitate discussing macro options at micro-level
decision making. In particular such comparative research could
also establish the extents to which different countries havework-
able exceptions to the principle of res judicata, which imposes
limitations to discuss macro options at a project level. As res ju-
dicata is a general principle of law, relevant in all legal fields,
consideration should also be given to exceptions to the principle
of res judicata developed in other fields than environmental law
(i.e., internal comparison), such as general administrative law
or private law. Based on the findings, future research could
examine whether the rules existing in a given country allowingOne Earth 2, April 24, 2020 345
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OPEN ACCESS Perspectiveto discuss macro options at micro level can be transplanted to
other countries.64,65 With regard to different legal fields within
the same country, future studies could look at whether relevant
rules can be applied by means of interpretation by analogy to
environmental law or if legal reforms are needed.66
Research on Public Preferences. It is critical to understand
which decisions about climate policy people see as major and
want to be able to influence at micro-level decision making.
Studies have shown that if people think that projects are already
pre-baked and will continue despite public input, this may fuel
public resistance.7,32 Yet, these studies have not looked at which
decisions people want to influence or would have liked to influ-
ence earlier. For example, people may not necessarily want to
(re-)consider how much CO2 emissions need to be reduced,
but they may want to (re-)discuss why certain mitigation options
(e.g., renewables, carbon capture and storage) and not others
(e.g., reforestation) have been chosen. This could imply, for
example, that when deciding upon authorization of a wind
park, people may want to discuss whether wind energy is the
best choice in the first place. Furthermore, at the level of specific
decisions, such as a gasoline tax, people may want to (re-)
discuss how the costs and benefits of climate policy are distrib-
uted and where the revenues go. Future studies need to examine
which decisions people want to (re-)open for public participation
in micro-level decision making.
Assessing the Effectiveness of Public Participation. There is
initial evidence that having influence over major decisions leads
to higher public acceptability of renewable energy projects than
having influence over minor decisions.31 Future experimental
studies could systematically disentangle different types of deci-
sions at amicro level (e.g., decisions over the type of technology,
the distribution of costs and benefits) to study their effects on
perceived procedural fairness and public acceptability of the
end decisions. Also, future research could unveil possible
boundary effects of (re-)discussing macro options at a micro
level on effective climate policy. For example, if macro-level de-
cisions become less certain because they can be changed at
every level of decision making, this could reduce the willingness
of industry and companies to invest in sustainable innovation to
combat climate change.67Conclusion
We have shown that there may be a cleavage between legal
frameworks and public preferences for public participation in
climate policy making. People want to influencemajor decisions,
yet they want to participate particularly in micro-level decision
making. Given current legal frameworks, many important deci-
sions are made at a macro-policy level; public influence at a mi-
cro level is therefore limited. This cleavage may inhibit early and
meaningful public participation and fuel public resistance
against climate policy. Cross-disciplinary research is needed
to find out how to reconcile legal frameworks and public prefer-
ences to develop effective public participation practices that
lead to socially more acceptable climate policies.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
The survey was conducted in November and December 2018 across 20 mu-
nicipalities in the Province of Groningen, the Netherlands. We collected data346 One Earth 2, April 24, 2020door-to-door, approaching people at their homes and asking them to fill in a
questionnaire. Respondents received a questionnaire, which they could fill in
by themselves and which was later picked up upon appointment. From
1,142 returned questionnaires, we excluded 13 that did not have the signed
informed consent, three that came from respondents younger than 16, one
that did not contain any data, and four that contained only demographic
data; the number of responses per question is reported in the figures. Sample
demographics are as follows: 490 women, 598 men, 5 indicated ‘‘other’’ for
gender, and 28 did not indicate gender; age 16 to 88 years (mean = 51.82
years, SD = 16.57 years), 65 did not indicate age; distribution across low, mid-
dle, and high education groups was 12.8%, 42.5%, and 41.6%, respectively
(3.2% indicated other or no education, or did not indicate); compared with
the general Dutch population, the current sample is more highly educated
and has lower income. Preferences for the public to be informed, have a
say, and decide about sustainable energy transition (Figure 2) were each
measured with two items, which were averaged, namely how desirable
(1, not at all desirable; 7, very desirable) and necessary (1, not all necessary;
7, very necessary) it is to inform local residents (n = 1,070; Cronbach’s
a = 0.821; mean = 6.17, SD = 0.922), give them a say (n = 1,068; Cronbach’s
a = 0.918; mean = 5.78, SD = 1.261), and let them decide about policy and
take decisions about sustainable energy transition (n = 1,069; Cronbach’s
a = 0.951; mean = 4.44, SD = 1.677). Next, we asked about two items, which
we averaged, how desirable (1, not at all desirable; 7, very desirable) and
necessary (1, not all necessary; 7, very necessary) it is to involve local
residents in developing general visions about energy transition (e.g.,
how much CO2 should be reduced) (n = 1,074; Cronbach’s a = 0.912;
mean = 5.08, SD = 1.59), regional strategies for energy transition (e.g.,
how much solar and wind energy should be produced in their province)
(n = 1,073; Cronbach’s a = 0.906; mean = 5.44, SD = 1.39), and concrete
projects (e.g., wind projects in my neighborhood) (n = 1,074; Cronbach’s a =
0.888; mean = 5.82, SD = 1.31) (Figure 3). We measured with one item to
what extent (1, not at all; 7, very much) respondents themselves would like
to be involved in decision making about the energy transition in the
Netherlands (n = 1,085, mean = 3.38, SD = 1.723), their province (n = 1,086,
mean = 3.93, SD = 1.784), their municipality (n = 1,082, mean = 4.50,
SD = 1.824), and their direct environment (n = 1,083, mean = 4.96,
SD = 1.893) (Figure 4). We conducted repeated measures ANOVAs with a
Greenhouse-Geisser correction, followed by multiple comparisons with
Bonferroni adjustment.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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